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A. INTRODUCTION 
Earnscliffe Research and Communications is pleased to present this 
report to the Independence Standards Board (ISB).  It is based on a 
total of 131 one on one interviews conducted over a four-month 
period.  The interviewees were selected, in roughly equal measure 
from the following segments: 
CEO’s of SEC registrant companies 16 
CFO’s of SEC registrants 24 
Chairs of Audit committees of such companies 18 
Buy side investment analysts 18 
Sell side investment analysts 17 
Audit partners 19 
Regulators 19 
 
The sample was distributed roughly equally across these groups, as 
indicated below.  Interviews were done in person or on the phone, 
based on the preference of the interviewee.  A complete listing of 
those who were interviewed is attached to this report as Appendix A. 
The objective of this research undertaking was to assess the 
perceptions of different audiences around the question of auditor 
independence and objectivity.  As part of the enquiry, interviewees 
were asked to consider whether they thought a problem currently did 
exist, what the ideal mix of safeguards would be, and which priorities 
they would set for the future in this area.   
The interviews followed a semi-structured agenda, ensuring that each 
interview captured a certain amount of essential information, but also 
allowing the interviewee latitude to take the interview in a direction 
that reflected their personal experiences and perspectives.  The 
interview guide used is attached to this report as Appendix B. 
Bruce Anderson, Principal and one of the founding partners of the 
Earnscliffe Strategy Group, Canada’s best respected public affairs 
firm, designed the research program, conducted more than 60% of 
the interviews, and authored this report.  Questions and comments 
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are welcomed and may be addressed to him directly, at 613-233-
8080, or by email at anderson@earnscliffe.ca 
We would like to acknowledge the helpful guidance of the ISB Board, 
and the considerable assistance of the ISB staff, led by Art Siegel, in 
the development and execution of this project.  The project has been 
a highly interesting and challenging assignment and our work with the 
ISB has been most enjoyable. 
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B. THE OVERALL HEALTH OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Each of the interviews began with a discussion of the participant’s 
view of the quality and reliability of the financial reporting system in 
the US.  The results of this probing are very helpful in setting the 
context for the findings around auditor independence issues, and can 
be summarized as follows: 
 With very few exceptions, interviewees felt that the standard 
of financial reporting in the US was excellent.  They indicated 
that they felt it was the highest standard that existed in the world 
today, had been for a long time, and would continue to be in the 
future.   
 While the vast majority felt that restatements of earnings and 
stories of misrepresentation of financial results seemed 
more prominent, relatively few were convinced that 
misbehavior was really rising.  More often, interviewees felt that 
the combination of a bull market with broad (and anxious) 
participation, coupled with a huge increase in media coverage of 
markets and investments was giving an impression of a rise in 
problems. 
 The general consensus seemed to be that there might be a 
slight deterioration of integrity over time, but no more 
significant in the financial and business sector than in 
society as a whole.  Many people voiced the opinion that the 
more fast-paced, highly competitive global economy meant that 
individual executives felt more at risk and therefore possibly 
tempted to be more aggressive than they might have been in the 
past.  They were also saying that while more people might feel 
more tempted to act inappropriately, the number who acted on 
that temptation might not be much different than in the past. 
 A fair sized minority (probably 40% of the total sample) took 
the view that while the standard of financial reporting in the 
US was excellent, reporting requirements were becoming 
unreasonably complex.  They argued that the average investor 
(meaning even the average institutional investor) could not really 
digest some of the material that was now being required, by 
changes in accounting standards.  It should be noted that a fair 
number of analysts agreed with this point of view.  Others argued 
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the opposite case, and said that even more reform was needed to 
accounting standards in order to ensure that today’s newer, more 
complex business transactions did not allow room to mislead 
investors.  
 Several of the regulators interviewed worried that their 
organizations were finding it difficult to keep pace with the 
changes in the increasingly global and complex transactions 
which companies were entering into.  This contributed to a 
sense that investors might be at greater, and less apparent, risk 
than they had been in years past. 
 Despite the concerns just listed, the overall sentiment about 
financial reporting was positive, and respondents attributed this to 
several factors: 
i. The fact that most people involved in the process had 
integrity and cared about doing a proper job.  This benefit 
of the doubt was conferred equally on CEO’s, CFO’s and 
auditors.  As such, participants signaled a view which was an 
important underpinning of their attitudes around a number of 
issues probed subsequently: auditors are not seen as any 
more or less likely to act with integrity than are their clients.  
While everyone acknowledged that one of the auditors’ 
functions is to protect investors against malfeasance, the 
assumption was that this service was not frequently called 
upon. 
ii. The fact that litigation pressures served as a deterrent for 
those who might be inclined otherwise.  Some offered this 
point of view with a sense of dismay, lamenting that “too often 
we teach by lawsuit”, others simply saw it as a fact of business 
life. 
iii. The fact that rules and regulations existed, along with 
oversight, as a way of further deterring, finding and 
penalizing inappropriate action.  For the most part, 
respondents felt that the fewer, and more simple the rules, the 
better from the standpoint of both investor protection and the 
cost of doing business.  At the same time, there was a 
widespread acknowledgement that a considerable amount of 
rules and oversight was needed, given the size and 
complexity of the financial markets. 
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iv. The fact that most companies of any size cared greatly 
about having a pristine reputation in order to have low 
cost access to capital.  Many CEO’s and CFO’s indicated 
that a problem that required earnings restatement was a major 
problem for them, something they very much wanted to avoid.  
In this sense, they looked upon auditors as an additional 
check to ensure that their companies were reporting 
appropriately, to save embarrassment down the road. 
KEY FINDING 
FINANCIAL REPORTING GENERALLY WELL REGARDED 
Reasons: 
 Integrity of participants, including auditors 
 Litigation pressures 
 Rules, regulations, standards 
 Desire for access to capital 
 The annual audited financial statement is seen as an 
important part of financial reporting, however, its’ role has 
become more secondary over time.  Most participants noted 
that investment decisions are increasingly made on the basis of 
more time sensitive, than that which is contained in the annual 
report.  While asserting that audited financials were a basic 
requirement, their role in investment decisions was seen as 
providing confirmation and reassurance about information that 
was already in the public domain. 
A number of participants, most notably among the analyst 
community, also said that the data that affects investment 
decisions is increasingly somewhat different than the more 
standard categories included in the annual report.  
 The mood among most respondents, with the exception of 
regulators, was that caution was necessary when raising the 
level of public debate about financial reporting and its 
reliability.  Everyone acknowledged they had a stake in 
maintaining a high level of public and investor confidence in the 
underpinnings of the market.  Since the market had been 
performing well for most, there was a disinclination to do anything 
that might disturb things.  Regulators took the view that the 
“It’s the auditor’s job 
to say when the rules 
are being bent to 
breaking” CEO 
“A sledge hammer 
can’t settle 
everything” Auditor 
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debate about how best to sustain confidence in the markets was 
a critical one to have now and better to have it now than in the 
wake of some debilitating future correction.  They felt that strong 
language was occasionally necessary to catalyze a debate that 
others might be reluctant to engage in. 
In summary, most of those interviewed were quite satisfied with the 
overall quality and reliability of the information which companies were 
making available to investors.  They felt it was the best in the world 
and had been improving over time.  Most doubted that there was a 
significantly greater effort to misrepresent performance than there 
had been in the past, and cited a number of factors, which they felt 
were useful checks against inappropriate behavior.   
The role of the external audit and the auditor were seen as important 
checks, but not the only or necessarily predominant ones.  They 
expected that annual audits would help deter or expose earnings 
reporting problems, but they also assumed that the more frequent 
disclosures from companies to markets represented an area of 
increasing risk. 
While expressing broad satisfaction, there was a sense that markets 
were becoming more complex, competitive and aggressive all the 
time, and that scrutiny was on the rise as well.  This led most to 
conclude that a debate about standards for auditor independence 
and objectivity was legitimate. At the same time, many (a majority 
among auditors, and probably 30% of other non-regulatory 
segments)  worried that the profile, tone and the tenor of the debate 
might serve to frighten more than enlighten investors.    
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C. THE BROAD VIEW OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
In order to fully understand what people think should be done to 
assure auditor independence in the future, it is useful to begin with an 
understanding of to what degree there is a perceived need for 
change. 
During the course of the interviews, it became clear that most of the 
audience segment were in general agreement around this question.  
Their opinions can be summarized as follows: 
 In general, respondents had a positive view of auditors and 
the way in which they performed their jobs.  Underneath this 
generally positive view, emerged a number of interesting and 
occasionally conflicting findings.  
i. Some chafed at the fees charged by audit firms, while others 
talked about the depth and competence that their auditors 
offered.  Often people did both. 
ii. Some lamented that auditors seemed not as respected as 
they had been in the past.  Others offered the view that the 
work of the auditor was mundane, not all that interesting or 
challenging.  A surprising number expressed both views, 
despite the irony. 
iii. Some felt that the profession had not done a very good job of 
protecting its reputation over time, while others noted that 
auditors deserved greater respect for integrity than investment 
bankers and lawyers. 
Overall, however, there was a feeling that auditors were 
professional, competent, and played an important role in the 
functioning of financial markets, even if the prominence or luster 
of that role was in relative decline. 
 The vast majority of respondents believe that auditors are 
currently performing audits, which meet a high standard of 
objectivity and independence.  They believe that audit firms 
take their responsibilities seriously in this regard.  They also 
maintain that clients who attempt to compromise the auditor’s 
independence are few and far between.  They expect that several 
“The auditors don’t 
want to be some 
grunts grinding out 
dull but necessary 
work.” Analyst 
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factors are helping ensure that auditors take their responsibilities 
seriously: 
i. their training in the unique responsibilities of public 
accountants  
ii. their firms’ concerns about reputation (based on the reliability 
of financial statements it attested to) and its importance to 
future success  
iii. their firms’ concern about legal liability 
iv. the personal integrity of the auditor 
v. the auditor’s desire to protect his or her reputation and career 
KEY FINDING 
AUDITORS CURRENTLY MEET HIGH STANDARD OF 
INDEPENDENCE 
Reasons: 
 Training in Public Responsibility 
 Personal integrity 
 Desire to protect reputation and career 
 Firms’ concern for reputation 
 Concerns about legal liability 
 
 Most interviewees (auditors generally excepted) believe that 
the pressures on objectivity and independence are growing 
over time, and are becoming somewhat worrisome.  The main 
driver of this change, according to our interviewees, is the 
evolution of accounting firms into global, highly competitive, multi-
disciplinary consulting enterprises.  There is a perception that this 
evolution has led to the following: 
i. Fees are cut, and margins shaved, in order to win an 
assignment, with the hope or expectation that more lucrative 
consulting arrangements will be available with the client in the 
future.  This implies auditors are developing a stronger interest 
in their relationship with management, perhaps at the expense 
of their responsibilities to shareholders. 
“The economics of 
accounting firms is 
driving growth and 
taking away from the 
professionalism of the 
audit.” CFO 
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ii. Audit firms have created not necessarily deliberately, an 
internal culture whereby the role of the auditor is often seen as 
inferior to the role of the consultant.  This has made it more 
difficult to attract and retain quality professionals to work on 
audit assignments, and has created adverse economic and 
peer pressures on auditors.  When auditors are put into the 
role of relationship managers, it is made clear to them that an 
important element of their job is to help broaden the array of 
services the firm provides to the client, and improve 
profitability as well. 
 Most believe that the future will present even greater 
challenges, if steps are not taken to contain these issues 
today.  There is a feeling that current safeguards may have been 
effective in the past, but the pace of change has been so dramatic 
that a new set of approaches may be needed.  Again, auditors as 
a group stand outside this general consensus, indicating a much 
lower degree of concern. 
 The principal consideration behind a demand for new 
approaches has to do with perception, more than real loss of 
objectivity.  Most people interviewed held that the volatility and 
visibility of financial markets, meant that the stakes associated 
with failures of objectivity and independence were growing rapidly.  
There was a general consensus that cases of failure were more 
widely reported, and with the huge increase in market 
participation by retail or individual investors, the political pressures 
to protect the consumer were growing.  Barring a vigorous private 
sector response, regulatory initiatives, which most would rather 
avoid, were seen as inevitable. 
10%
A Real Independence Problem
Exists Today
20%
A Perception Problem Exists Today
 
 
“The Big 5 have had a 
major cultural change 
– that’s the real 
source of risk” 
Analyst 
“Perception is non-
measurable and 
perception is the 
problem here” CEO 
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30%
A Real Independence Problem will
Exist in the Future Barring Change
50%
A Perception Problem will Exist in
the Future Barring Change
 
In reporting the general consensus just described, it is important to 
note that two of the segments stood out somewhat from the rest.  
Auditors, while not unanimous, were more likely to make the case 
that the current safeguards, with some modest updating, would be 
adequate to deal with future pressures.  They maintained that audit 
functions and consulting services can co-exist indefinitely, 
perhaps inelegantly, but without causing an erosion, or 
perceived erosion, of objectivity and independence.   
Regulators, for their part, were at the opposite end of a spectrum.  
They generally maintained that the problem was a fundamental one, 
and that the issues of perception were only going to grow in time.  A 
good number pointed to an eventual downturn in the economy, or a 
major, prolonged market correction as being trigger events for a rapid 
increase in political pressure, and they felt that the backlash caused 
by disappointed investors would be severe.  Their view was that 
solutions were needed, sooner rather than later, and more 
sweeping than modest. 
KEY FINDING 
PRESSURES ON INDEPENDENCE GROWING 
Reasons: 
 The more aggressive culture of the financial marketplace today 
 Multi-disciplinary service offerings by audit firms 
 Audits as loss leader 
 Change in audit firm culture 
 Scrutiny on the rise 
 
In a nutshell, the general conclusion was that audits are not 
significantly compromised today, and may be only slightly more 
compromised in the future, if the current audit firm business model 
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continues unchanged.  However, more concern is attached to the 
question of maintaining confidence in the soundness of financial 
reporting, and a significant number feel that the current model is like 
“a perception accident waiting to happen”.   
This in itself is problematic, as the following chapters will describe.  In 
essence, this point of view argues for a very fundamental set of 
changes in the current marketplace, to prevent something from 
happening in the future, not something real, but something perceived.  
Not surprisingly, it was hard for people to find common ground on 
how much prevention, at whose cost, was appropriate.   
Furthermore, most participants, with the notable exception of 
regulators, felt their interests would be poorly served by a high profile, 
high-tension debate about these issues.  While on the one hand, they 
might see the need for change and communication about change in 
order to ward off perception problems, on the other they didn’t want to 
increase the perception problem by increasing the reach and volume 
of the debate. 
“The real issue is 
eliminating the 
perception of conflict.  
There is a perception 
problem and that’s a 
problem for the whole 
system” Analyst 
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D. PRESSURES ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Having established the broad dimensions of concerns about auditor 
independence, it is useful to dig deeper into the roots of these 
concerns.  During the course of the interviews, a good deal of probing 
was done on the nature and extent of the pressures affecting auditor 
independence, either in fact or in perception. 
The main findings are as follows: 
 Virtually everyone agreed that when accounting firms only 
did audit work, there was some risk of impairment, but that 
the level of risk was acceptable.  The inherent risk cited was 
that the audit firm is paid by management, while performing a 
function on behalf of shareholders, and that the interests of 
management and shareholders do not always coincide perfectly.    
There was a belief that in this environment, the risk was 
minimized because audit firms had to care very deeply about their 
reputation among shareholders for doing quality, reliable work, 
since the audit was their bread and butter.  Also, the sense was 
that the independent directors could add more support to the audit 
firm as needed, and that the audit firm would be more willing to 
call on that support than might be the case if they had no other 
assignments from management. 
 As audit firms developed new lines of business, their 
preoccupation with audits was seen to be gradually in 
decline.  As people offered this point of view, they did not do so in 
a critical way, but stated it as a matter of fact.  They understood 
why a professional services firm would want to expand and grow, 
and that the existence of competition actually demanded that they 
do so, to some degree.   
There was an implicit understanding that asking firms to perform a 
public interest function (audits) while operating in a free enterprise 
economy, is something of a recipe for some problems.  No one 
offered a better solution (some discussed, but then rejected the 
bank examiners model as too radical and costly), but all sensed 
that there was a certain degree of tension which markets could 
not naturally resolve, since the public interest function was not 
market based. 
“Integrity is the 
commodity they’re 
selling” CEO 
“No one wants to pay 
for the audit service.  
It’s losing its value” 
Analyst 
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 The large majority of interviewees in each segment 
(including auditors) have sensed that in recent years 
accounting firms have lost their preoccupation with audits, 
and become much more preoccupied with growing new 
areas of consulting revenue.  Many felt that within firms, the 
psychic and financial rewards were tilted heavily towards the 
consulting side, and that auditors who wanted to be well 
compensated and respected by peers, needed to support the 
growth of the non-audit functions.  This perception was even 
shared by a fair number of auditors, who in some cases lamented 
the new preoccupation. 
As people offered this perception, it was clear that some were of 
the view that these pressures could lead to compromises of 
objectivity, for example, where the size or profitability of a non-
audit relationship dwarfed that of the audit.  The reasoning was 
that the individual auditor, if not the firm or the office, would feel at 
risk if they were to cause a breach in such a relationship over an 
audit item. 
However, even those who refused to believe that such a 
compromise could occur, were generally concerned about the 
appearance of such a situation.  Typically, these views were 
voiced as “If a problem ever occurred, such as a fraud or a major 
restatement, this relationship would look bad, even if it had 
nothing to do with the substance of the problem”.   
 Audit clients are also seen to have had a considerable role to play 
in the increased pressures.  This manifested itself in a number of 
ways: 
i. The drive by all corporations to cut costs has led to 
considerable pressures to cut audit fees.  A fair number of 
the CEO’s and CFO’s in our sample noted that they felt that 
audit costs were high, and growing over time, especially for 
those companies which had become more global in their 
reach.  They felt that while audits were necessary to 
sustaining market approval, their relative value was declining 
as other, more time sensitive forms of financial reporting took 
precedence in the minds of shareholders and investors.   
ii. There was no evidence that this drive to reduce audit 
costs was motivated by a desire to see a more lax audit.  
“The power structure 
at audit firms has 
shifted dramatically” 
Analyst 
“The audit’s a loss 
leader now” CFO 
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CEO’s and CFO’s were actually at pains to indicate that they 
valued the input of their outside auditors in terms of 
understanding what was working well or poorly within their 
companies.  So while they wanted fees trimmed, they also 
wanted a rigorous, top quality job done.  Worth noting is that 
they perceived that audit firms were willing to meet these 
demands. 
iii. Roughly half of the CEO’s and CFO’s interviewed said 
that they liked to use their audit firms for non-audit 
assignments, because they felt that it was likely to result 
in better consulting at a more reasonable cost.  They 
reasoned that their auditors were better able to understand 
their needs, that they had a relationship that worked, and that 
the audit firm would be motivated to do a good job and charge 
reasonable fees, knowing the client was a long term, important 
relationship.   
However, the other half of CEO’s and CFO’s took a different 
view.  While they didn’t dispute the cost-effectiveness 
question, they said that they generally preferred to avoid a 
situation where outsiders might raise questions about the 
relationship between client and auditor.  Generally, they would 
give only limited assignments to their audit firm, or allow them 
to bid on tenders, but require that they be demonstrably better 
than other bidders in order to get the work. 
KEY FINDING 
PERCEPTION RISKS RISING DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS 
 Firms are increasingly reliant on consulting 
 Client pressures to cut audit fees, demand for consulting 
support 
 Psychic and financial pressures on audit partners 
 Ability to meet appearance test of angry shareholders 
 
 Interestingly, most of those interviewed agreed on the question of 
“earnings management” and its role in the auditor independence 
equation.  The commonly held view can be summarized as 
follows: 
“When their economic 
interests are too great, 
you run into problems” 
Audit Chair 
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i. Earnings management is not a new phenomenon, 
although it is garnering more attention of late, because of 
the long running bull market, the instant and dramatic 
reaction to earnings reports which are outside the norms, 
and the proliferation of media reporting on financial 
affairs. 
ii. While roughly one in three interviewees (across most 
segments, much higher among regulators) feel that 
earnings management efforts have become more 
aggressive, a roughly equal number dispute that 
assertion.  Those who dispute the assertion offer that 
emerging growth areas of the economy, such as technology, 
entertainment, information, are exposing weaknesses in 
accounting rules, either requiring more or allowing more 
“judgement calls”, than would be possible in more traditional 
areas of the economy.  This point of view holds that if 
judgement calls are possible, management will always tend to 
err on the side of massaging reports for advantage. 
iii. Most importantly, few feel that earnings management as 
practiced today involves any meaningful participation by 
auditors.  Earnings management was characterized as highly 
time sensitive, involving decisions made within a company, 
and communications made directly with financial markets.  
The audit firm is seen by most analysts, CEO’s, and CFO’s as 
more or less irrelevant to this communication, except at the 
end of a year, and in serving as a deterrent to fraud or gross 
misrepresentation.  While most interviewees accept the idea 
of auditors reviewing quarterly earnings reports, not as many 
felt that they should issue opinions on same.  In fact, the 
majority thought that this would be both costly and likely 
counterproductive, in the sense that it might give the markets 
a false sense of security about the reliability of numbers which 
had only been reviewed, rather than audited.   
iv. Consistent with this view, most felt that the demands of 
analysts had little to do with the role of auditors.  Some Buy-
side analysts said that they viewed the audit firm-client 
relationship with suspicion, but tended to rely on their own 
sources of information to base their investment decisions on.  
They saw the audit as an essential part of good governance, 
and felt that changes were needed for the future, but did not 
“The focus on near-
term earnings has put 
real pressures on 
management.  That 
puts real pressures on 
auditors.  I don't like it” 
CFO 
“Nothing is that 
precise in terms of 
accounting” CFO 
“The problem is 
managing expectations, 
not earnings” CFO 
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feel that their performance as analysts was being affected by 
auditor independence issues today. 
 In discussing the question of earnings management, there were 
three factors which people thought might represent exceptions to 
their general views: 
i. Many felt that there was a greater potential for a large 
corporation to put more pressure on a smaller audit firm, 
or for a smaller auditor to avoid a dispute with a larger 
client.  While people said that they doubted that mismatches 
like this occurred very often, some buy side analysts said they 
would see it as a warning sign if the audit firm and client 
seemed mismatched by size. 
ii. There was a broad, but somewhat vague consensus, that 
new sectors of the economy represented a greater 
challenge to the auditor client relationship.  Some felt that 
audit firms were especially anxious to establish strong 
relationships in areas of new growth.  Also, there was a feeling 
that accounting rules had been designed to apply to 
companies which manufactured, shipped and sold traditional 
services and goods, and that knowledge based product sales 
offered more room for judgements to be exercised, because 
rules were not so firmly established or understood.  In this 
circumstance, the reasoning went, there was more potential 
for auditors to accept aggressive accounting practices, and for 
appearance problems to develop. 
iii. Finally, there was a general view that the largest and most 
stable companies, especially those whose equities were 
not seen as growth investments, were less likely than 
other companies to be drawn into aggressive earnings 
management.  As a consequence, people were saying that 
growth oriented stocks and mid cap companies might 
represent a bigger area of challenge to the independence of 
auditors. 
In summary, a combination of economic pressures and 
opportunities has contributed to the growth in potential for 
perception problems around auditor independence.  Within audit 
firms, there has been pressure to expand non-audit revenues.  
This has resulted in a changed internal dynamic, where psychic 
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and financial rewards are skewed somewhat, reducing the 
prestige of audit work. 
From the client side, auditors feel pressure to cut audit costs, and 
receive somewhat mixed signals about the potential to broaden 
and deepen the relationship with non-audit assignments.  
Consequently, while the relationship can sometimes seem to 
carry great potential, it is somewhat inherently insecure.  If this 
sense of insecurity does not lead to real erosion of independence, 
it can clearly add weight to a potential perception problem going 
forward. 
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E. CURRENT SAFEGUARDS FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
A good deal of time was spent exploring perceptions of current 
safeguards and their ability to help protect against real or perceived 
problems of auditor independence.  This was another area where 
certain segments stood out from one another. 
In general,  
 Auditors were much more likely to say that the current 
safeguards were adequate or needed only a slight amount of 
fine-tuning.   
 Regulators, on the other hand, were much more of the view 
that the current accounting firm model seemed 
fundamentally unworkable, or if not, then major initiatives 
would be needed to strengthen safeguards and protect 
investor confidence in the markets.   
 Audit committee chairs tended to see independence safeguards 
as a work in progress, requiring constant attention, and 
continuous improvement. 
 CEO’s and CFO’s said that they assumed that current safeguards 
were probably appropriate, but the more they discussed the 
questions around non-audit services the more they indicated a 
feeling that there might be room for too much discretion. 
 Analysts felt that the combination of safeguards, laws, regulations, 
and litigation pressures were all necessary, but they also believed 
that human temptation was always going to exist, and no system 
could be perfect. 
To the extent that some findings can be generalized, they can be 
summarized as follows: 
 Most people felt that as long as audit firms did non-audit 
work for their audit clients, there would need to be a certain 
number of safeguards, and that these would have to be 
updated from time to time. 
 Outside those who were or had been auditors, very few 
people had any significant knowledge about the safeguards 
that exist within the audit firm.  There was a general 
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understanding that firms tried to erect some sort of “walls” that 
there were periodic rotations and reviews of partner work, and 
that in-house training programs existed to help assert the 
importance of independence.  Most people said that they thought 
these were all useful ideas, and were probably working as well as 
they could. 
 However, the majority of respondents felt that if the 
perception challenge was growing, these devices might 
ultimately be insufficient to sustain confidence in the 
independence of auditors.  They felt that the judgement of 
observers would turn on how the financial incentives and 
penalties were organized: if it appeared that a firm had more 
upside in bending to a client’s pressures, then internal processes 
would only be of limited value.  Not everyone felt that this was the 
perception today, rather they were offering the view that internal 
firm safeguards had limited prophylactic value if the scrutiny were 
to become more punishing. 
 Most had a sense that there were laws and regulations 
governing the question of independence, but few had a clear 
picture of what they were, who mandated them, and how 
rigorously they were applied.  Participants saw a clear link 
between the work of organizations like the SEC, the AICPA, 
FASB, and NASBA.  They felt that the work of these various 
bodies had to be linked together, and given consideration in the 
development of standards by the ISB. 
FASB was seen as a necessary linkage because of the 
perception that there were accounting judgement calls that 
needed to be cleared up, especially in areas touching on one-time 
charges, and affecting mergers and takeover activity.  The SEC 
was seen as a crucial link because most felt that “a regulatory fix”, 
while distasteful, was inevitable if measures to limit the potential 
problem were not taken voluntarily.  The AICPA was looked upon 
as an organization that needed to take a leadership role in 
advancing the perception of the public interest role function of 
auditing, even if this proved to be at odds with the business model 
of major multi-disciplinary firms.  State Boards were seen as a 
vital part of the mix, as they have licensing leverage, and because 
of the need to avoid a patchwork approach. 
“I’d hire honest 
policemen and then 
spy on them” Audit 
Chair 
“As long as the 
(independence) rules 
aren’t clear, you’re 
begging for problems” 
CFO 
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 Most people had little knowledge of the ISB to date, and 
while judging that its work would be important, hoped that it 
would take a somewhat higher profile in the future.  At the 
same time, not everyone agreed what the purpose and tone of 
this profile should be.  Some (analysts in particular) wanted the 
ISB to be a voice somewhat independent both of the regulator 
and the profession.  Others (auditors most notably) wanted the 
ISB to bring some balance to a debate they felt was imbalanced 
by the public statements of the regulator.  Still others (regulators 
especially) wanted the ISB to represent the perspective of the 
shareholder and investor community, including the retail or 
individual investor, and move swiftly and visibly to remedy 
problems and create a more sound framework for the future. 
 There was a widely held view that some existing rules may need 
to be reviewed and replaced or updated in order to help build 
credibility for the future.  Many voiced the view that members of 
audit firms might be unduly restricted in the financial transactions 
they were permitted, and that rules regarding family relationships 
might need to be modernized as well.  Those who advocated 
such changes were not looking for greater laxity, but were saying 
that a new set of standards, in order to have credibility, should 
logically strive to be as contemporary as possible. 
 Respondents were generally aware and mostly supportive of 
the work of the Blue Ribbon Panel.  There was a broad 
conviction that Audit Committees could serve a more important 
role in dealing with both substantive and perception issues around 
auditor independence.  While endorsing the direction, many were 
at pains to point out a view that the quality of audit committees 
varied widely (and likely always would), something which would 
limit the effectiveness of this approach to managing future 
problems.  Also, a fair number of people offered the view that the 
Panel took perhaps too narrow a view of the kind of qualifications 
which might enable an Audit Committee member to do an 
effective job. 
“Someone has to hold 
up the shining light of 
standards” Analyst 
“You can’t micro-
manage judgement” 
CFO 
“There’s nothing like 
plenty of daylight to 
keep people honest” 
CEO 
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KEY FINDING 
LOW AWARENESS OF CURRENT SAFEGUARDS 
 Apart from auditors, few know much about in-firm safeguards 
 More awareness would help reduce apprehensions 
 But rising scrutiny may mean external pressures also needed 
 Desire for ISB to work in concert with others, add careful profile to 
debate 
 
In summary, the majority view was that current safeguards needed to 
be reviewed and updated.  While most people who lacked first hand 
experience weren’t really familiar with the current rules and firm-
specific safeguards, they felt that if the perception challenge were to 
grow, then the current self-regulatory approach would be insufficient 
to meet the test of public confidence.  Alternately, many offered the 
view that the self-regulatory model would be sufficient if audit firms 
only did auditing, or did only auditing for their audit clients.  
“It’s not enough to say 
their reputation is 
everything.  The jails 
would be empty, if 
everyone worried 
enough about their 
reputation” AC 
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F. NON AUDIT SERVICES IN FOCUS 
While the non audit services offered by accounting firms was easily 
the most perplexing issue surrounding auditor independence in the 
minds of our interviewees, it is instructive to break this category of 
findings down in more detail.  
For one thing, not all non-audit services conjured up equal levels of 
disquiet, and some produced great consensus while others great 
division.  The findings can be summarized this way: 
 The situations which were more likely to raise concerns 
about the prospect of a real or perceived problem of auditor 
independence include the following: 
i. Situations where the size of consulting fees greatly 
exceed the size of audit fees.  Most said that this should be 
looked at as a general principle, rather than a hard rule, since 
some consulting arrangements were more costly by nature.  
However, they felt that the perception test would be harder to 
meet after a problem, if there were an imbalance of this sort. 
ii. Situations where consulting revenues routinely exceeded 
audit revenues.  In such a circumstance, many felt that the 
potential for a perception problem to develop was greater.  
Some argued that such a situation should not be allowed to 
occur, others argued that companies must take greater 
precautions, (e.g. through Audit Committees and disclosure to 
shareholders) if they were likely to find themselves going in 
this direction. 
iii. Situations where bookkeeping type services were being 
provided to clients.  Some clients seemed to feel that they 
should be permitted to buy these services from their auditors, 
especially in foreign or distant markets, provided  that 
accounting judgements were not being made by employees of 
the audit firm.  However, many auditors seemed to feel that 
this was an area of potential reputation risk, and that the line 
between judgement and non-judgement services was harder 
to draw in today’s economy. 
  
Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board 
 
- 24 - 
EARNSCLIFFE  
RESEARCH &  
COMMUNICATIONS 
iv. Situations where consulting contracts were awarded to 
the auditor without competitive bidding.  Roughly half of 
the companies interviewed indicated that they avoided such a 
practice, while others said that they used discretion, but 
occasionally did so.  Auditors generally were silent on this 
question.  Analysts, regulators, and audit committee chairs 
were more likely to say that in a world where everyone had a 
stake in preventing perception problems, this practice should 
be avoided. 
v. Situations where consulting assignments were so large, 
or of a particular nature, so as to be logically touched on 
by a subsequent audit.  Some felt that installing computer 
systems was not a problem, as long as the firm had a 
demonstrated expertise, others argued that if the computer 
system had anything to do with the financial reporting 
systems, or if a major problem with the project would normally 
be reported to shareholders, then the auditor would be in 
serious conflict. 
vi. Situations where the importance of the consulting 
assignment was unusually important to the audit firm, 
such as a contract in an area where the firm was trying to 
develop a marketable expertise and the contract represented 
an anchor for business development. 
vii. Situations where the importance of a single client to an 
individual partner, or to a particular office was unusually 
high.  While most said that the test which people talked about 
was “whether the firm could afford to walk away from the 
client”,  they felt that the more appropriate test was “what 
would the consequences be to the partner or the office that 
walked away from a major client” over an audit dispute. 
 There were some areas where opinions were clearly in stress, 
meaning that people felt pulled both ways, and considered the 
matters to be important.  These included: 
i. Situations where the audit firm was providing business 
strategy advice to the client.  Most people felt that with the 
appropriate firewalls in place within the audit firm, this might 
not cause a problem, but others felt that if the client followed 
“Auditors should not 
be allowed to sit in 
judgement of 
themselves” CEO/Audit 
Chair 
“You can’t trust 
anyone, if there’s too 
much temptation” Audit 
Chair 
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the advice and the strategy failed, the auditors had a 
reputation risk, which might impair their objectivity. 
ii. Situations where tax advice turned into tax representation 
or advocacy.  While most said that this had traditionally been 
a role which auditors had played, and that it had not caused 
problems of independence in the past, there was a worry that 
as perception questions became more prominent, this was a 
more challenging situation.  In particular, those concerned 
talked about the prospect of audit firms becoming seen as 
advocates for accounting rules which might be seen to work 
against the interests of shareholder transparency. 
iii. Situations where internal audit functions were 
outsourced to the independent auditor.  While most felt 
that this was in no way problematic, a notable minority took 
the position that this might lead to a lower standard of 
protection for the investor. 
KEY FINDING 
CERTAIN NON-AUDIT SERVICES TRIGGER GREATER 
CONCERNS 
 Where consulting fees exceed, especially if routinely, audit fees 
 Where bookkeeping services are provided 
 Where consulting assignments were so large or of a nature to be 
potential audit items 
 Where assignment is key to a growth strategy of a consulting 
division 
 Where a client was disproportionately important to an individual 
auditor or office 
 
In summary, respondents generally held the view that the evolution of 
audit firms into the consulting fields was logical.  They felt that if 
audits were not going to be performed by the public sector (as with 
bank examiners) then the private sector providers must be afforded a 
certain degree of latitude in terms of growing their businesses, 
especially in a competitive sector.  Many also felt that the provision of 
most consulting services was not likely to create a real problem of 
audit independence, but almost everyone agreed that the potential for 
appearance problems to be created was quite significant. 
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G. TESTING SPECIFIC SCENARIOS 
In the course of conducting these interviews, a number of scenarios 
were developed for use in focussing attention on the kinds of practical 
situations in which an independence issue might or might not arise.  
These scenarios, and the responses which they generated, are 
summarized here. 
 
SCENARIO I 
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop 
and install a new SAP computer system for their client, ACME 
Manufacturing.  ABC earns $10 million for the computer system work, and 
$1 million per year for their audit of ACME.  The consulting contract equals 
about 1% of ABC’s annual revenues. 
ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in 
competitive bidding, and the question of whether such a contract would 
impact the independence was raised with ACME’s audit committee, which 
decided that there was no impairment.  ACME management has the 
necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the 
necessary decisions around it. 
 The vast majority of interviewees did not perceive a real loss of 
independence in this situation.  However, a notable minority, 
probably around 30% felt that there was a significant risk of 
impairment, if things turned out badly around this particular 
assignment. 
 Even more respondents worried that the perception of such a 
large assignment could be troublesome, again if all did not go 
smoothly. 
 Respondents indicated that a number of factors would determine 
the degree of risk involved. 
i. First off, the sheer size of the contract was seen as a potential 
perception challenge.  Even though $10 million might be good 
value for the client, and only a tiny fraction of the audit firms 
business, there was a sense that observers would doubt that 
the firm would be willing to walk away from such a 
relationship, if that were necessary to protect the 
independence of the audit.  Auditors typically felt differently on 
this issue, putting forward the case that the separation of audit 
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and consulting practices within the firm, together with the 
auditor’s and firm’s commitment to audit integrity would be 
adequate to satisfy any doubts. 
ii. The size of the consulting contract relative to the audit fee was 
also seen as an important factor.  
iii. The proportion of firm revenues represented by the total 
billings to any single client were seen to have a significant 
effect on auditor independence.  In general, “one off” 
consulting assignments were seen as less troubling than a 
steady flow of consulting revenue.  
iv. Finally, the role of the audit partner was deemed important.  
Respondents were aware that the lead engagement partner 
can and often does become an advocate for a broader 
relationship with a client, but most respondents felt that the 
auditor’s participation should stop at introduction. 
 Everyone felt that a contract of that size needed to be submitted 
to tender, and that the Audit Committee had to be involved in the 
process of awarding the contract.  Some felt that to be awarded 
such a contract, the audit firm should have to beat other bids by a 
considerable margin. 
 Interviewees generally felt that investor confidence would not be 
shaken by this scenario.  However when asked to consider the 
same scenario where the consulting contract equaled 20%, rather 
than 1%, of the audit firm’s revenues (or the consulting arm’s 
revenues), most agreed that there would be both a significant 
degree of real and perceived risk.  
 Interviewees’ assessment of risk was linked to their levels of 
confidence in the current safeguards.  Auditors were confident 
that internal safeguards such as ‘Chinese walls’, or firewalls were 
sufficient.  Management and audit committee members felt that 
as long as companies appropriate disclosure of such 
assignments, they could mitigate risks, although they tended not 
to want to do this very often.  (As well, there was a separate 
question about disclosure requirements.  Some felt that disclosure 
to a broader audience of investors would help deter real 
objectivity problems, and mitigate perception problems: others felt 
that doing so would only serve to fuel suspicions that 
inappropriate behavior was rising.) 
“Independence is a 
state of mind” Auditor 
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 The analyst and regulatory communities shared concerns about 
the size and nature of the assignment, and felt current safeguards 
offer little or no guarantee of independence.  They were more 
likely to feel that nothing short of a strict separation of the audit 
and consulting services would really mitigate the risk in such a 
situation.  They differed in how plausible or important they thought 
this to be. 
SCENARIO II 
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his 
annual audit of Kate Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of CFO, with 
a rich compensation package. 
Doe immediately stops doing any work for Kate Inc, and notifies the 
management of BBB about the offer.  After a short period of reflection, he 
takes the job, and ends all financial ties to BBB.  BBB immediately 
conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of Kate, makes sure it 
selects a senior partner to work on Kate’s audit in the future, to ensure 
proper skepticism, and schedules QA and Peer Review inspections for 
next year. 
 An overwhelming majority of respondents saw neither a real loss 
of independence nor an unacceptable risk that auditor 
independence could be impaired in the future. 
 Most also agreed that the perception of reasonable investors 
would not be negatively affected in this situation.  Many noted that 
this type of situation is highly common, and quite productive from 
the standpoint of both the audit firm and the client.  They 
reasoned that the audit firm could not attract good people, if those 
people had to foreclose the option of moving to the client side at 
some time.  They also felt that clients should have the opportunity 
to recruit people who understood their business well and had 
established good working relationships within their organization. 
 Beyond feeling comfortable because this situation arose so often 
without creating problems, respondents were also satisfied that 
the procedures taken by the individual and the audit firm were 
effective and important.   
 The only areas of concern that appeared to have any resonance 
had to do with timing questions.  Most took considerable comfort 
from the fact that the offer was not made until the opinion was 
signed for the year, however a few noted that audits were 
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increasingly a year round process.  Similarly, there was some 
debate about whether current guidelines were clear enough on 
the question of what type of discussion qualified as a reportable 
matter, or a step towards an offer. 
 While some were concerned that there seemed to be a 
correlation between incidents of earnings misrepresentation and 
the recruitment of auditors into CFO positions, most seemed to 
feel that this was not causal, but coincidental. 
SCENARIO III 
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computers, based in New 
York.  Ace’s Vancouver office does some routine bookkeeping work for 
Moll’s Portland subsidiary, MCP.  
MCP accounts for no more than 4% of Moll Computer’s revenues, and 
would not normally be visited by an audit team, because of its size.  The 
bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of 
the Ace Portland office, which is separate from the audit department.  The 
work includes processing company-supplied data, which is then reviewed 
and approved by MCP officials, before being forwarded to Moll’s 
headquarters in New York.  Ace personnel do not prepare any source 
documents, sign checks, have custody of assets or make significant 
judgements. 
 There was a clear lack of consensus about this scenario.  Most 
did agree that it probably did not pose a significant real problem of 
independence, but many worried that the question of 
bookkeeping assistance can be a difficult one.   
 There was a feeling that even if the work did not involve 
“significant” judgements, outside observers might doubt the 
auditor’s independence, if the firm’s staff was implementing 
accounting treatments which were likely to be a subject of dispute 
with the auditor down the road.  
 A number of auditors said that their firms prefer not to do any of 
this type of work because of concerns about how it might be 
perceived.  They felt that even if they could make the case about 
the routine and non-judgmental nature of the work, that 
participating in any aspect of internal accounting was better 
avoided. 
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 While several CEO’s and CFO’s said that this was a type of 
assistance, which they liked to be able to draw upon, they 
acknowledged that it could fall under unfavorable scrutiny. 
 When asked how they would feel if the number of markets being 
served were to grow over time, many began to feel 
uncomfortable.  Even if the dollar values were not material, they 
simply felt that it implied too close a relationship, and too stable a 
flow of revenues to the non-audit service side of the firm. 
 There was a general feeling that the distance between the New 
York headquarters and a Portland subsidiary office provided 
some, but limited comfort. 
SCENARIO IV 
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s 
Boston office.  She has two relatives who happen to work for two different 
Tendy clients.  
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer.  He has $8000 
in Able’s stock option plan.  Jane and her husband earn a combined 
income of more than $200,000 per year.  Able’s audit is done by Tendy. 
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly 
growing company in Portland Maine.  Portland is 120 miles from Boston, 
and all services for Simple are provided by Tendy’s Portland office.  Jane 
has no involvement in either client’s account.  She sees her brother 
socially about once a year. 
 There was a remarkably vigorous discussion about this scenario.  
It was a subject of careful consideration and seen as very topical.   
 Interviewees overwhelmingly sensed that no real impairment of 
independence had occurred with respect to either the brother or 
the husband.  This was largely because Jane was seen to have 
no material ability to affect the audit of either company.  Many felt 
that the relationship and distance rules should have significance 
only if Jane was involved in the audit itself.   
 But at the same time, respondents acknowledged that the 
perception issues were real, critical to Jane’s reputation, the 
reputation of her firm, the perceived integrity of the audits, and the 
reputation of the clients involved.   
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 There was a widespread feeling that the rise of dual income 
families, the increased entry of women into the workplace and the 
increasingly global reach of audit firms has rendered relationship 
and distance rules somewhat archaic.  Most felt that the current 
rules governing personal relationships are quite strict and created 
an impediment to attracting and retaining new entrants to the 
profession.  Others argued that it was only appropriate that 
auditors be held to a higher standard than other participants in the 
financial community are, given the attestation function they 
perform.  They felt that any relaxation of rules, even admittedly 
archaic ones, might be perceived as a weakening of the 
commitment to independence. 
 The majority felt that application of sound personal judgement by 
the auditor was the best assurance of a high degree of 
independence when it came to personal relationships.  Most 
people were of the view that there was no substitute for general 
principles of conduct applied with personal judgement. 
 As well, many interviewees looked to the internal culture of audit 
firms as vital.  They talked about the importance of “tone at the 
top” and in some cases, wondered aloud if it was as clear and 
firm as it had been in the past.  Some auditors acknowledged 
some concerns of this sort as well. 
 Most people felt that the perception question surrounding Jane’s 
husband was less significant than those involving her brother.  
They reasoned that the amount of money involved was 
immaterial, and that the husband’s role in the company was not at 
a senior enough level to cause concern. 
With respect to Jane’s brother, there was more concern, 
particularly because of his role as CFO and the fact that his firm 
was rapidly growing.  There was a feeling that his company might, 
over time become a more important client of the firm.  Ultimately 
people were reassured by the fact that Jane and her brother lived 
in different cities, and rarely had contact with each other.  When 
asked how they would feel if “Jane’s brother regularly contacted 
her for advice on investments” most felt more uncomfortable with 
such a situation. 
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 Full disclosure of these situations was viewed as critical to 
maintaining the reality and perception of independence.  Most 
people felt the auditor had a strong obligation to disclose any 
potential (real or perceived) conflict arising from personal 
relationships not just to their own firm but to their clients as well.  
Audit committees were cited as an important line of defense for 
management and shareholders.  The overriding assumption is 
that once disclosed, these relationship issues could be assessed 
on a case by case basis to determine whether they offended 
either the shareholders or management sense of propriety. 
 In an age of jet travel and instant Internet access, many 
interviewees signaled that the comfort provided by geographic 
separation was diminishing over time.   
In summary, four scenarios were tested which explored a number of 
contemporary dimensions of the question of auditor independence.  
In all but one case, there were mixed opinions, and a lack of 
consistency in how participants felt current guidelines could or would 
normally be applied.  This underscored a call for greater clarification 
and a hope for greater consistency over time, in how auditors and 
their clients set and meet the tests of independence.  This degree of 
uncertainty was highest when significant consulting relationships 
were at stake, and when family relationships were involved. 
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H. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 
During the course of the interviews, a fair bit of probing was done to 
determine what respondents felt should be priorities for change.  
Accepting as a starting point that not all audiences were equally 
convinced that change was needed, or that much change was 
needed, the main points findings can be summarized as follows: 
 The broad majority of respondents felt that there are too 
many “gray” areas where the role of auditor as consultant to 
their audit clients is concerned.  In some cases, this feeling 
had to do with the fact that people are unfamiliar with the 
regulations and policies that currently exist, in others it was based 
on a feeling that as things have developed, new, clearer 
standards are needed. 
 A fair number of people advocated a requirement of full 
disclosure as a way to both deter an unhealthy relationship 
between auditor and client, and to inform investors of any 
risks related thereto.  However others, CFO’s most notably, did 
not like this idea, as they felt that disclosure generally is 
associated with the idea of having done something inappropriate. 
 Almost everyone interviewed felt that the challenges of 
auditor independence would not be solved by writing new 
“bright line” type policies.  They reasoned that these would act 
not as a deterrent, but an opportunity for those who wanted to act 
inappropriately to understand how to structure such actions 
successfully.   
 Most preferred the idea of setting forth broad principles, 
which should underpin the relationship between auditor and 
client.  Alongside these broad principles, many endorsed the 
idea of developing a series of “best practices” advisories.  
These would set out common situations, and indicate what the 
best practice would be for auditors and clients to follow in order to 
protect against real and perceived independence problems.  
Some went further and suggested that those companies which 
chose not to follow these best practices should be required to 
disclose this fact, and their reasons for deciding not to.  However, 
many preferred not to go this far, arguing that this step would 
convey too great a degree of suspicion where none might be 
warranted. 
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 There was a wide consensus that any changes to strengthen 
standards should be accompanied by a review of existing 
rules, and the termination of those that are archaic.  These 
might include certain aspects of the restrictions on financial 
dealings by employees of audit firms, and more contemporary 
perspectives on the issues of spousal relationships. 
 Most interviewees felt that an essential or important part of 
any effort to strengthen independence and the perception of 
independence, had to have a strong communications 
component.  They reasoned that to affect perception, those 
whose perceptions mattered had to be aware of both the existing 
safeguards as well as any new increments that might be added to 
the mix.  While some segments felt that the audiences in question 
were institutional and corporate exclusively, others (especially, but 
not exclusively the regulatory segment) felt strongly that the 
individual investor was a key audience, perhaps more important 
than any other. 
KEY FINDING 
A VARIETY OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 
 Fewer gray areas, more clarification, better communication 
 Broad principles and best practices, not bright lines 
 Greater disclosure, stronger audit committees 
 Review existing rules, add and subtract as necessary 
 Review audit firm internal practices 
 
 While a fair number of interviewees felt that the best ultimate 
solution to the independence question would be for 
consulting and audit practices to separate, few anticipated 
that this would happen in the short term, if at all.  There was 
also an acknowledgement that even if this did occur, the residual 
issue of a service provided to shareholders, but contracted for 
with management, would still offer the potential for perception 
problems.  As a result, people generally expected that the best 
approach would involve a number of components: 
1. A review of audit firm internal practices, to ensure that 
standards are as high as they should be, and as consistently 
applied as possible.  While many felt that independence 
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procedures might be areas of competitive advantage, there was 
also a feeling that the reputation of the profession as a whole rose 
or fell on the performance of the weakest performer.  As such, 
some argued that a more standardized approach might be more 
advisable.   
2. A gathering and communication of the variety of component 
safeguards affecting independence.  Both those working within 
the audit firms and those outside, felt there would be value in 
drawing together, in one source, the major component elements, 
whether they emanate from FASB, SEC, ISB, AICPA, State 
Licensing Boards, etc. 
3. Greater precision about the acceptable and unacceptable 
practices in seeking or accepting consulting assignments 
from audit clients.  Many people, including a fair number of 
auditors, said that they were unsure about certain practices and 
felt that more precision, or at least a clear restatement of how 
current guidelines should best be applied, would be helpful.  This 
could include several components: 
i. The nature of marketing activities for non-audit 
assignments with audit clients.  Who should be involved, 
linkages to the audit assignment, competitive bidding, are all 
subjects which could potentially be treated under this heading. 
ii. The nature of non-audit services which have greater 
potential to create the risk of perception problems.  At the 
present time, many felt that they had a great deal of discretion 
in this area, perhaps more discretion than was advisable, if the 
perception risk was to be reduced. 
iii. The size or relative thresholds of audit versus non-audit 
assignments.  While people said that a simple numerical 
formula probably wouldn’t make sense, in the context of “best 
practices” they felt some guidance would be appropriate. 
iv. The appropriate role of senior audit engagement partners 
in managing a broader relationship with the client.  During 
the course of the interviews it was clear that different audit 
firms had different practices, and that clients were occasionally 
uncomfortable with some current approaches.  Some auditors 
and clients feel that they can best assure independence if the 
auditor is the point person for the whole relationship, others 
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feel that this represents a significant risk, at least from a 
perception standpoint. 
v. This was particularly sensitive when it came to the 
question of compensation procedures for audit partners, 
who were acting as relationship managers.  Different 
policies exist in different firms.  While some clients are 
comfortable with the fact that firms reward auditors for 
relationship growth (as one component of performance, with 
only a modest impact on overall compensation), others feel 
that any linkage between the compensation of the auditor and 
the growth of the non-audit relationship is entirely 
inappropriate. 
KEY FINDING 
GREATER PRECISION SOUGHT AROUND NON-AUDIT WORK 
 Nature of marketing and selling activities 
 Nature of services which should not be offered to audit clients 
 Size or thresholds for audit vs. non-audit fees 
 Appropriate role of audit partners 
 Compensation for audit partners 
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I. SUMMARY OF KEY SEGMENT DIFFERENCES 
As the various sections of this report have indicated, the audience 
segments for this study had different perspectives on a number of 
matters.  This section of the report will attempt to summarize in one 
place the nature and importance of these differences. 
CEO’s 
There was a mixture of opinions registered by the CEO’s in this 
study: this was not a particularly homogeneous group.  Generally 
speaking, they were more concerned about good corporate 
governance, and wanted to be able to rely on their auditors to keep 
their companies from reporting anything which might later be a cause 
of embarrassment.  Many indicated a strong feeling that the quality 
and reliability of financial statements issued by their company was a 
matter which touched very directly on their personal reputations. 
Most of the CEO’s felt that there was not a real problem of auditor 
independence, but that there was a slight, but growing perception 
issue which should be addressed.  They saw their auditors more as 
suppliers than business partners, and had few strong feelings one 
way or another about using them for non-audit services. 
While they liked the idea of having the flexibility to do so if it was the 
most cost-effective solution for a particular consulting assignment, 
they understood the arguments against having too significant a 
relationship with the audit firm, and were prepared to accept a world 
where this flexibility might be reduced or even eliminated. 
To some degree, the more they thought that scrutiny of non-audit 
assigments to their audit firm would rise in the future, the less they 
wanted to be placed in a position of influencing or even supporting 
such a decision personally. 
CEO’s generally felt that the pressures to manage earnings were not 
all that new, although the pace and severity of market reactions was 
increasing over time.  They felt that there had always been and 
always would be important judgement calls to be made about 
accounting treatments and thought that a professional, cordial and 
respectful relationship with their auditors was a useful element of 
helping arrive at sound decisions. 
“Everyone has to 
recognize ethical 
standards are more 
important than 
everything else” Audit 
Chair/CEO 
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While the majority voiced some frustration at the profile and tone 
taken by the SEC in raising issues of earnings management and 
audit independence, most accepted that politcal stakeholders felt 
apprehensive about the breadth of participation in stock markets, and 
wanted to err on the side of caution.  Some argued that it was 
necessary to use language which would create an impact, since the 
debate might not take place otherwise. 
Ultimately CEO’s felt that a combination of measures would be 
necessary to ease the potential of perception problems: more clarity 
around current regulations and safeguards, better education of 
investors about the safeguards which exist (in order to reduce the 
pressures on political and regulatory bodies) as well as the kinds of 
ideas favored by the Blue Ribbon Panel. 
CFO’s 
This group was fairly homogeneous on some issues, and showed 
clear divergence on others.  The main points of agreement began 
with the fact that they were, next to auditors, the segment which was 
least convinced that independence (real or perceived) was under 
significant pressure. 
CFO’s generally saw their auditors as key suppliers, partners in 
business to a limited degree, and they very much liked to have a 
direct relationship with the most senior engagement personnel.   
They felt that their audits were conducted with a high degree of 
independence and objectivity and felt that whatever pressures were 
inherent in the auditor-client relationship were being successfully 
managed by themselves.  While they acknowledged the role of the 
audit committee, they saw it as being a “failsafe” in the event that they 
failed to do their jobs properly.  As such, they were somewhat less 
enthusiastic about the Blue Ribbon recommendations, although not 
opposed in principle. 
Some CFO’s took quite a firm and restrictive view of the idea of hiring 
their auditors to do non-audit work.  A few said that they almost never 
would consider it, a few others said that audit firms could bid on 
assignments, but had to be considerably superior to other bids in 
order to win the assignments.  Another number said that they liked 
the idea of using their auditors for many assignments and that as long 
as they submitted a competitive bid they would get the assignment.  
“You can never get to 
zero risk” CFO 
“Essentially all auditors 
are honest people with 
very few exceptions but 
the lines are getting 
fuzzy now” CFO 
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Finally a few felt that they were comfortable making some assigments 
to their auditors directly, without a competitive process, and were 
ready to defend those decisions as legitimate management 
prerogative. 
Almost all of the CFO’s were wary of the idea of new regulation 
around financial reporting, claiming that current rules were already so 
complex that even the best honest effort could still run afoul of some 
rules inadvertently.  They argued that the largest clients and the 
largest auditors generally operated in a fully appropriate fashion and 
that they should not be saddled with additional costs and complexity 
because of the misbehaviour of a small minority.  They urged that 
solutions to any perception problems show restraint around the 
instinct to regulate, establish best practices rather than bright lines, 
educate investors, and target offenders as much as possible. 
Auditors  
As a group auditors were more homogeneous than any other except 
perhaps regulators.  There were some important generational gaps, 
noted below, but otherwise auditors had a fairly common view of the 
world. 
The general sentiment was that the quality of audits was improving 
over time, as audit firms became more expert, and more able to bring 
a broader set of skills to bear on behalf of a particular client.  Auditors 
were also insistent that there were no greater issues of independence 
today than there had been in the past, and they recognized that the 
unique role and structure of the relationship presented natural 
challenges. 
Auditors felt that as a group they had been rigorously trained, and 
within firms, constantly coached, to maintain the state of mind 
required to provide proper attest services.  They felt that the issues of 
independence and audit failures had been exaggerated by media 
coverage, and that there were far more significant problems of real or 
perceived conflict in the role played by securities firms and 
investment bankers.  
Auditors accepted the potential for perception problems to occur, and 
recognized that these questions were becoming more prominent.  At 
the same time, they bridled at the notion that they might have to 
“There’s no substitute 
for an honest client” 
Auditor 
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consider altering their business model, simply to avoid a perception 
problem, when the reality was that there was no impairment. 
Notwithstanding their sense of frustration with the issue and the 
debate, there was a view that some remedies would be helpful in 
defusing the tensions.  Their preferred actions included education of 
investors about current safeguards, clarification and modernization of 
some of the rules, publication of best practices, and an expanded role 
for Audit Committees.  They were inclined to reject the idea of bright 
lines as ineffective.  
While the views described above were generally held, a handful of 
those auditors who had the longest experience took a somewhat 
different view on the impact of the multi-disciplinary evolution of their 
firms.  They felt that over time, despite safeguards and best efforts 
within firms, auditors couldn't help but notice a certain difference in 
the environment surrounding client relationships. 
They felt that auditing was portrayed within firms as less profitable 
than consulting work, and increasingly important only as a way of 
generating consulting opportunities.  They felt that the compensation 
structure was creating a disincentive for good people to stay in 
auditing, and for clients to respect the auditors who served them.  
While they did not conclude that this had impaired objectivity and 
independence to date, some wondered whether the management 
structure and business strategies of their firm could or would continue 
to take appropriate account of the unique role of the independent 
auditor.  
Audit Committee Chairs 
This segment was fairly homogeneous, and enthusiastic about 
participating in the study.  Without exception, they all felt that the work 
of the Audit Committee was of great importance, and increasing in 
importance over time.   
Also without exception was the view that the companies they served 
took the role of the audit committee very seriously (which could be to 
some degree a self-selection bias).  They saw themselves as serving 
the interests of shareholders and the rest of the Board, rather than 
management.  They felt that company management supported their 
efforts to inquire into important issues, have a private relationship with 
the audit firm, and to offer dissenting opinions as appropriate. 
“Audit Partners are 
being made to feel like 
sales people” Auditor 
“You really need to put 
it through the wringer 
and be absolutely sure” 
Audit Chair 
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They felt that the number of problems in financial reporting were 
probably not increasing in number, but were certainly increasing in 
profile.  They sensed that the pace of change and competition, as 
well as the heightened scrutiny, meant that regardless of whether 
there were real problems of independence, a greater degree of 
caution needed to be exercised. 
All felt that one of the more important matters for them to be involved 
in reviewing was the awarding of non-audit assignments to the audit 
firm.  As a group, they tended to feel that the less of this that went on, 
the better, and several said that they supported a policy of no 
additional work for the audit firm. 
They did not quarrel with the instinct on the part of audit firms to 
expand into other areas, and were reluctant to support solutions that 
restricted their access to new lines of business.  At the same time, 
they had a keen sense of the need to meet their own obligations to 
shareholders.  Insofar as remedies were concerned, they favored 
greater clarification of current guidelines, the publication of best 
practices to help provide guidance in new areas, and a general 
principles rather than bright lines approach. 
KEY FINDING 
CONCERNS ABOUT INDEPENDENCE VARY BY TIME, SEGMENT 
 Real 
problem 
today 
Perception 
problem 
today 
Real 
problem 
tomorrow 
Perception 
problem 
tomorrow 
Auditors None Slight None Slight 
CEO’s None Slight None Moderate 
CFO’s None Slight Slight Moderate 
Buy-side Slight Moderate Slight More 
serious 
Sell-side None Slight Slight Slight 
Audit 
Committee 
Slight Slight Moderate More 
serious 
Regulators Moderate Moderate Serious Serious 
 
  
Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board 
 
- 42 - 
EARNSCLIFFE  
RESEARCH &  
COMMUNICATIONS 
Regulators 
Regulators were a unique audience in this study, and were fairly 
homogeneous in their views.  They regard the issues as more serious 
and more pressing than the other segments, and are impatient to see 
solutions coming out of the private sector stakeholders. 
While some took the view that there were few real issues of 
independence today, the view of SEC interviewees was that there 
were immediate problems of fact today.  All felt that perception 
problems were growing, and that they needed to be dealt with sooner 
rather than later. 
In particular, there was concern that a downturn in the economy 
and/or a major market correction might cause a number of problems 
in past reporting to become evident.  That coupled with the prospect 
of a significant deterioration in the paper wealth of millions of 
consumers meant that pressure for a political intervention into the 
marketplace was highly likely, if protective measures were not taken 
in advance. 
There was a sense that the pace of change in the economy, means 
that accounting rules have trouble keeping up, and this leads to a 
greater degree of discretion in reporting than existed in the past.  
Together with the fact that so many investment decisions are being 
made on the basis of non-audited information, regulators would 
rather strengthen the role of the independent auditor, or at least not 
see it weakened in any way.  With only one or two exceptions, those 
regulators included in this sample felt that the business model of the 
largest accounting firms was putting pressure on independence and 
on the appearance of independence. 
The ideal world for most regulators would likely be one in which audit 
firms did only audit work.  Failing that, they would prefer that audit 
firms did their consulting work only for non-audit clients.  Failing that, 
they want to see a significant ramping up of effort to safeguard 
independence and to ensure that individual investors have the 
protection of independent audits and as importantly, feel as though 
they have that protection.  In offering this latter point of view, it was 
clear that regulators felt that this study should take into account the 
views of individual, and not just institutional investors. 
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While regulators value the kind of safeguards which firms impose 
internally, they signaled that they didn’t feel that these would be 
adequate over the long term.  They worried that the profession had 
been moving too slowly to deal with the issues around non-audit 
assignments and were looking for the ISB to improve the pace of 
activity in this area. 
They strongly felt that efforts should be stepped up to educate 
investors about the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders 
and the steps that are taken to assure reliable information, along with 
the limitations therein.  This, they felt, would help reduce the risk of a 
severe political backlash in the future.  
(A methodological point: while virtually all other interviews were done 
on a one to one basis, several of the SEC participants preferred to be 
interviewed as a group, a desire that was accommodated) 
Buy Side Analysts 
Buy side analysts were fairly homogeneous, with the exception of a 
few who had previously worked as auditors and whose perceptions 
were influenced by that experience.  Overall, they tended to be 
sanguine and skeptical about the question of auditor independence at 
one and the same time.  
They were generally of the view that financial reporting and the 
audited financial statements could be trusted, while asserting that the 
audited statements were of minimal importance compared to other 
sources of data.  They felt that the relationship between auditors and 
clients was becoming an unhealthy one, and that something probably 
ought to be done about it. 
While offering this latter opinion, they also indicated that they 
personally, as well as their firms, were careful not to become 
victimized by financial reporting which misrepresented the 
performance of companies.  In effect, they were saying that they 
would rather see steps taken to remedy the situation than not, but 
that they were taking their own protective measures in any event. 
Their view that the relationship between auditors and clients was 
becoming unhealthy was partly based on a belief that the incidents of 
abuse were increasing in number over time.  Some felt that there had 
been an embarrassing and costly increase in such incidents. 
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But mostly it was based on a view that the financial dynamics of the 
evolving relationship were unavoidably dangerous, and a desire to 
insure against a more significant increase in problems in the future.  
They saw the inclination to cut prices on audits in order to win more 
lucrative consulting assignments as the kind of circumstance which 
would have the potential to corrupt even the least corruptible 
individuals.   
As such, they were not impugning the integrity of the auditors, nor 
even saying that it had been all that damaged to date.  However, they 
had a strong sense that virtually anyone’s motivations can be altered 
if the economic penalties and incentives are substantial enough. 
Finally, buy side analysts felt the issue of reliability of financial 
reporting would only become more prominent as the hunt for value in 
a highly priced stock or rapidly correcting market became more 
intense.   
They recognized the impact that they as a group had on earnings 
management, and lamented that markets seemed to be overreacting 
to short term considerations, and that they were contributing to that 
effect.  At the same time, they argued that it was up to companies to 
issue financial statements, and up to the market to react as it chose 
to.  They would not take responsibility for efforts by companies to 
manage earnings, did not think it was a new phenomenon, and 
considered it to be more or less manageable, from their standpoint. 
Sell Side Analysts 
Sell side analysts were also quite homogeneous in their views.  As a 
group, they have concerns about the pressures on financial reporting 
and auditor independence, but they feel that they can live with the 
status quo.   
There is concern about the prospect that a downturn might expose 
more problems than people imagine, but sell side analysts indicate a 
clear stake in market momentum and worry about the prospects of a 
high profile debate undermining confidence in the markets. 
They see the annual audit as a “table stakes” part of financial 
disclosure, perhaps losing importance over time, but always 
something that will be necessary and useful.  They are quite 
confident that the largest companies and the largest auditors 
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generally do a good job and resist pressures to manage earnings too 
aggressively.  They assume that there is a fair amount of give and 
take in the normal auditor-client relationship and that earnings 
management is not a new phenomenon. 
As a group, they are highly resistant to the idea of greater regulation 
of any sort, preferring to believe in the ability of the market to correct, 
over time, any excesses.  While offering their views, several in this 
segment acknowledged that their views tended to fluctuate, and that 
their perceptions were highly influenced by what appeared in the 
media. 
They had generally a low level of detailed understanding of the 
current safeguards around auditor independence, and had not done 
a great deal of thinking about the issues of how to set standards for 
the future.  For the most part, there was some skepticism about the 
potential for Audit Committees to do much to alter the current 
situation. 
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J. CONCLUSION 
This study examined a complex web of issues among a set of 
audiences, which often had different points of view.  As such, the idea 
of drawing conclusions has some inherent hazards. 
Nonetheless, we believe it is both necessary and possible to draw 
some conclusions based on these findings, and would focus attention 
on the following: 
1. Most of those interviewed felt that the quality, depth and reliability 
of financial reporting in the United States is better than that found 
anywhere else. 
2. Most felt that auditors of public companies perform a valuable 
function and do so in a way which reflects a high degree of 
integrity, competence, and independence. 
3. Most felt that the evolution of accounting firms to multi-disciplinary 
business service consultancies represents a challenge to the 
ability of auditors to maintain the reality and the perception of 
independence. 
4. The challenge is most apparent in two circumstances: 
i. When auditors pursue or accept consulting assignments with 
their audit clients. 
ii. Because of the increasingly intense media and investor 
scrutiny which exists today. 
5. While some believe that perceptions of the independence of 
auditors is already suffering some corrosion, more people take 
the view that damage is inevitable in the future if greater 
precautions are not taken to protect the perception of 
independence. 
6. Auditors stand at one end of the spectrum of views on these 
issues, tending to feel that they are managing the pressures 
effectively, and that few further precautions are required.  At the 
other end of the spectrum are regulators, who feel that the 
profession needs to move more aggressively and rapidly to 
strengthen safeguards on a voluntary basis, or have a more 
stringent regime imposed.  The rest of those segments included in 
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this sample fall somewhere in between these poles, closer to the 
auditors’ view on the question of problems to date, and closer to 
the regulators on the need for further action going forward. 
7. No one believes that these challenges can be solved easily, or by 
one set of measures.  Instead, there is a tendency to favor a 
combination of efforts, involving a variety of different stakeholders: 
i. The ISB should set out very clear standards regarding non-
audit assignments for audit firms with their audit clients.  
These should ideally be accompanied by a set of “best 
practices” which can be added to and amended as necessary 
over time, (these might more appropriately be issued by 
another organization, such as the SEC Practice Section). 
These standards might usefully address the following 
subjects: 
 Those consulting services which are more or less 
appropriate for audit firms to supply to their audit clients. 
 The ideal and acceptable practices for selling and bidding 
on consulting assignments. 
 A view on the relevance of the size of the consulting 
arrangements, in absolute terms, relative to audit fees, and 
whether on a one-off or sustained basis. 
 The ideal and acceptable roles for the audit engagement 
partner to play in securing and helping manage non-audit 
work.  Compensation should be addressed as well. 
ii. An effort should be made to regroup in one source all the 
measures in place presently to safeguard auditor 
independence and objectivity.  This would include government 
and professional regulations and codes of conduct, audit firm 
and client practices which are common, (if not codified) and 
should incorporate a discussion of the importance of scrutiny 
by buyers/investors. 
iii. A careful review of existing rules, regulations and standards 
with a view to making them as clear and contemporary as 
possible.  Where necessary to enhance credibility, some rules 
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could be abandoned, and some penalties or sanctions could 
be strengthened. 
iv. An initiative to raise the level of investor familiarity with the 
safeguards which are in place and the care they should take 
as investors in consuming the financial reports of companies 
they might invest in. 
We look forward to discussing this draft report with the ISB prior to 
issuing a next draft in advance of the upcoming Board meeting. 
EARNSCLIFFE
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APPENDIX A - INTERVIEWEES BY GROUP
CEO’S OF SEC REGISTRANT COMPANIES
ABN-AMRO
Airtouch
BF Goodrich
BP Amoco
Brunswick Corporation
Cendant
Chase Manhattan
Guardian Life Insurance
IMC Global
Knight-Ridder
Nipsco Industries
Nucor
Ryder System, Inc.
TIAA-CREF
United Stationers
York International
Total
Bill Thiel 
Sam Ginn 
David Burner 
Lawrence Fuller 
Peter Larson 
Henry Silverman 
Walter Shipley 
Joseph Sargent 
Robert Fowler Jr. 
Tony Ridder 
Gary Neale 
David Aycock 
Tony Burns 
John Biggs 
Randall Larrimore 
Robert Pokelwaldt
16
CFO’S AND CONTROLLERS OF SEC REGISTRANT COMPANIES
Abbott Laboratories Dave Diamond
Allstate John Carl
Amerada Hess John Schreyer
American International Howard Smith
Avon Products Robert Corti
Chase Manhattan Joseph Sclaffani
CISCO Systems Dennis Powell
Colgate-Palmolive Steve Patrick
CostCo Richard Galanti
Hewlett Packard Robert Wayman
Interpublic Group Thomas Volpe
Lexmark David Goodknight
McDonald's Mike Conley
McGraw-Hill Robert Bahash
Newell-Rubbermaid Donald Krause
Pfizer David Shedlarz
Republic National Bank of New York Stan Martin
RJR Nabisco Dave Rickard
Unicom Robert Berdell
United Airlines Nancy Tauber
USG Corporation Richard Flemming
Washington Mutual William Longbrake
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Wells Fargo
Wells Fargo
Total
AUDITORS
Arthur Andersen
Arthur Andersen
Arthur Andersen
BDO Seidman
BDO Seidman
Deloitte & Touche
Deloitte & Touche
Deloitte & Touche
Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young
Grant Thornton
KPMG
KPMG
KPMG
Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Total
BUY-SIDE ANALYSTS
Aeltus Investments
American Express Asset Management
Dresdner RCM Global
Equitable Life Insurance
Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle
GATX Capital Corporation
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
Janney Montgomery Scott
Mutual of Omaha
Nationwide Insurance
Pilgram & Baxter
Security Benefit Life Insurance 
Selective Life Insurance
The Chubb Corporation
TIAA-CREF
Transamerica
Voyageur Asset Management 
Wanger Asset Management
Tom Emerson
Jim Thvedt
24
Jack Benedik 
Patrick Condon 
Michael Underwood 
Al Ferrara
Steve Ferrara 
Robert Giordano
Ralph Siegel
Tom Hoover
Lou Kramer
Tom Vogelsinger 
Steve Almassy 
Kunio Yoshioka
Paul Wirth
Dan Schmitt
Steve Marsh
Tom Colligan
John Baily
Keith Klaver 
George Kennedy
19
Scott Fox
Bill Miller
William Price
Peter Noris
Judy Daily
Ken Foster
James Rowan
Jerry Lombard 
John Maginn
Dave Diamond
Gary Pilgram
John Cleland 
Robert Rank 
Michael O’Reilly 
Martin Leibowitz
Gary Rolle
James King
Harold Litchenstein
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SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS
BancBoston Robertson Stephens 
Bear Stearns
First Chicago Capital
Goldman Sachs 
Goldman Sachs 
Goldman Sachs 
HSBC Securities
Janney Montgomery Scott 
JC Bradford
Keefe, Bruette & Woods 
Lehman Brothers
McFarland Dewey 
Morgan Keegan 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
Nomura Securities
Prudential Securities
The John Nuveen Company 
Total
18
Brian Bean
Patricia McConnell
Gerald Byrne
Ester Mills
Sarah Smith
Gabrielle Napolitano 
Jeffrey Haroldson 
James Myer 
Emily Evans
David Berry
Bob Williams
Alan McFarland
Minor Perkins
Joanne Pace
Mike Lowry
Paul Scura
George Adams
17
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRS AND MEMBERS
Amerada Hess Corporation
Amerada Hess Corporation
Anixter
Brunswick
Brunswick
Citigroup
Citigroup
Consolidated Edison
IMC Global
Interpublic Group of Companies
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch
Motorola
Pfizer
Tribune
Unicom
Unicom
Walgreen
Total
Robert Wilson 
Bill Spencer 
John Petty 
Michael Callahan 
Jeffrey Bleustein 
Dudley Meecum 
Alan Belda 
James O’Brien 
Harold MacKay 
Frank Borelli 
Michael Ainslie 
John Phelan 
Anne Jones 
Don Cornwell 
Arnold Weber 
James Compton 
Bruce DeMars 
Jim Schwemm
18
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REGULATORS
American Stock Exchange Sal Sodano
FDIC Robert Storch
NASDAQ Pat Campbell
National State Boards of Accountancy Dennis Spackman
National State Boards of Accountancy Robert Gray
National State Boards of Accountancy David Costello
New York Stock Exchange James Cochrane
Office of Comptroller of the Currency Zane Blackburn
Office of Thrift Supervision Timothy Stier
SEC Arthur Levitt
SEC Norman Johnson
SEC Isaac Hunt
SEC Brian Lane
SEC Robert Bayless
SEC Walter Schuetze
SEC Robert Walker
SEC Lynn Turner
SEC Harvey Goldschmid
US General Accounting Office David Walker
Total 19
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APPENDIX B - THE INTERVIEW GUIDE
A. CONTEXT
1. In general terms, how would you characterize the effort/quality/reliability 
of information sharing by public companies with the investing public? 
How has it changed?
2. How would you characterize the relationship between most public 
companies and their auditors? What about your approach?
B. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
1. Have you personally observed situations where the objectivity or 
independence of an auditor of a public company was impaired, or was in 
serious risk of impairment?
2. What factors are most likely to contribute to impairment of 
independence? What about to the perception of a loss of 
independence?
3. Is impairment of independence becoming more common or more rare? 
What impact, if any are these factors having? (Probes: financial 
markets changing, technology, consolidation, rules, regulations, 
safeguards, earnings management, analysts estimates, etc.)
4. In your opinion, is there an issue of auditor independence?
i. Whenever circumstances are such that the potential for impairment 
exists
ii. Whenever the circumstances are such that the risk of impairment 
occurring is greater than what might be considered normal.
iii. Only when circumstances actually result in an action which 
demonstrates a lack of independence.
5. As far as you are concerned, is there an issue of auditor independence:
i. Whenever a reasonable person might perceive a loss of 
independence, regardless of whether there has been any material 
impact, because it undermines confidence in the financial markets.
ii. When a loss of independence has actually occurred.
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iii. When a loss of independence has occurred that has resulted in 
negative impact on investors.
C. THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
1. Based on what you know, are current prohibitions governing the 
relationship between audit firms and their clients appropriate?
2. Over and above the prohibitions, are there adequate safeguards to help 
prevent impairment?
3. Here are some examples of safeguards, which are or can be taken to 
mitigate against a real or perceived loss of independence. Would you 
comment on the usefulness of each.
i. Chinese walls /physical separation/internal governance/tone at the 
top
ii. Stepped up role for Audit Committee
iii. Disclosure to the public of independence safeguards and 
procedures
4. From your perspective, what do you think the main priorities of the ISB 
should be? What sort of effort do you think that the ISB should make to 
communicate with different audiences over the next few years?
i. Perception/reality:
ii. Prevention/remedial:
iii. Bright lines/best practices/clear rules:
SCENARIO A
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop and 
install a new SAP computer system for their client, ACME Manufacturing. 
ABC earns $10 million for the computer system work, and $1 million per 
year for their audit of ACME. The consulting contract equals about 1% of 
ABC’s annual revenues.
ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in 
competitive bidding, and the question of whether such a contract would 
impact the independence was raised with ACME’S audit committee, which 
decided that there was no impairment. ACME management has the 
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necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the 
necessary decisions around it.
1. In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?
2. If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be 
impaired?
3. Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, 
mistrust the financial reporting of ACME? Of the reliability of audited 
statements more generally?
4. Would your views change if the consulting contract equaled about 20% 
instead of 1% of ABC’s revenues? Why/Why not?
5. Would your views change if the audit partner helped win this consulting 
contract, and as a result, is it likely to have a positive impact on the audit 
partner’s compensation by ABC?
SCENARIO B
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his 
annual audit of Kate Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of CFO, with 
a rich compensation package.
Doe immediately stops doing any work for Kate Inc, and notifies the 
management of BBB about the offer. After a short period of reflection, he 
takes the job, and ends all financial ties to BBB.
BBB immediately conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of 
Kate, makes sure it selects a senior partner to work on Kate's audit in the 
future, to ensure proper skepticism, and schedules QA and Peer Review 
inspections for next year.
1. In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?
2. If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be 
impaired?
3. Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, 
mistrust the financial reporting of Kate Inc.? Of the reliability of audited 
statements more generally?
4. Would your views change if John Doe turned down the job, and 
continued working on Kate’s audits?
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SCENARIO C
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computers, based in New 
York. Ace’s Vancouver office does some routine bookkeeping work for 
Moll’s Portland subsidiary, MCP.
MCP accounts for no more than 4% of Moll Computer’s revenues, and 
would not normally be visited by an audit team, because of its size.
The bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of 
the Ace Portland office, which is separate from the audit department. The 
work includes processing company-supplied data, which is then reviewed 
and approved by MCP officials, before being forwarded to Moll’s 
headquarters in New York. Ace personnel do not prepare any source 
documents, sign checks, have custody of assets or make significant 
judgements.
1. In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?
2. If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be 
impaired?
3. Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, 
mistrust the financial reporting of Moll Computers? Of the reliability of 
audited statements more generally?
4. Would your views change if MPC accounted for about 20% instead of 
4% of Moll’s revenues? Why/Why not?
5. Would your views change if the accounting assistance was provided to 
five of Moll’s subsidiaries, instead of one?
SCENARIO D
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s Boston 
office. She has two relatives who happen to work for two different Tendy 
clients.
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer. He has $8000 
in Able’s stock option plan. Jane and her husband earn a combined income 
of more than $200,000 per year. Able’s audit is done by Tendy.
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly 
growing company in Portland Maine. Portland is 120 miles from Boston, 
and all services for Simple are provided by Tendy’s Portland office.
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Jane has no involvement in either client’s account. She sees her brother 
socially about once a year.
1. In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?
2. If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be 
impaired?
3. Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, 
mistrust the financial reporting of either Able or Simple? Of the reliability 
of audited statements more generally?
4. Would your views change if Jane’s brother called her regularly for 
advice about investments and personal money management?
5. Would your views change if Jane Smith provided some consulting work, 
but no auditing services to Able?
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July 13, 1999
Dear______ :
I am writing to ask you to contribute half an hour of your time to an important research 
effort.
The Independence Standards Board (ISB) was established by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to provide and maintain independence standards for auditors of public 
companies. As part of its mandate, the ISB has commissioned Earnscliffe Research and 
Communications to conduct a small number of interviews among the most senior executives 
in a variety of business fields Earnscliffe is a firm highly experienced at conducting this 
type of research.
Attached please find a letter of request from Earnscliffe for an interview. The subject of the 
interview will be your views on how well auditor independence is maintained today, and 
how best to ensure auditor independence in the future. The views of those who agree to 
participate will be reported without attribution The findings will be used to help shape the 
agenda for the ISB in the years to come.
These interviews are ideally conducted in person, however if an in person interview is 
impossible, a telephone interview can also be arranged. Every effort will be made to do the 
interview at a time and in a location convenient for you.
We very much appreciate the challenge of finding a half an hour to spare, and hope that you 
will give this request favorable consideration If you would like to know more about the 
research or have any other questions, please do not hesitate to contact Art Siegel, Executive 
Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141.
Sincerely,
William T. Allen
Chairman
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July 13, 1999
Dear_______ :
Earnscliffe Research and Communications has been retained by the 
Independence Standards Board (ISB) to conduct a number of 
research interviews with a sample of very senior people in various 
business fields.
Further to the letter from the Chairman of the ISB, we are writing to 
ask if it would be possible to arrange an interview. Roughly one half 
hour of your time would be required. The subject would be your 
views on how well auditor independence is maintained today, and 
how best to ensure auditor independence in the future.
As is customary with this type of research, the views of those who 
agree to participate will be reported without attribution. The findings 
will be used to help shape the agenda for the ISB in the years to 
come.
Elizabeth Nickolas of my office will be in touch to follow up on this 
letter in the next day or two. We very much hope you will be able to 
find the time to share your views, and every effort will be made to 
conduct the interview at a time and a location convenient to you. If 
you would like more information before considering this request, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at (613) 233-8080 or Art Siegel, 
Executive Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141.
Sincerely,
Bruce A. Anderson
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